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Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism by Robert A. Pape. Random House (http://www.randomhouse.com/rhpg), 1745 Broadway, New York, New York 10019, 2005, 352 pages, $25.95 (hardcover), $14.95 (softcover).

In Dying to Win, Prof. Robert Pape argues that despite a widely held belief to the contrary, Islamic fundamentalism is not the root cause of suicide terrorism. Rather, 95 percent of such attacks between 1980 and 2003 occurred as part of coherent campaigns that had political and territorial--not religious--goals. According to the author's thesis, 'Suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation' (p. 23). Although this sounds like a rather narrow proposition, if validated, it could significantly weaken many other popular explanations for this phenomenon, such as globalization, a clash of civilizations,..

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For example, Robert Pape (2005) claims that more than 95 percent of the suicide terrorists in his study were motivated by a secular rather than a religious goal: to compel democracies to remove their military forces from the homeland of the perpetrators.

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Notable credit(s), with James K. FeldmanWebsiteRobert Anthony Pape Jr. (born April 24, 1960) is an American known for his work on international security affairs, especially the coercive strategies of and the rationale of. He is currently a professor of Political Science at the and founder and director of the (CPOST). In early October 2010, the University of Chicago press released Pape's third book, co-authored with James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It.

Contents.Career Pape graduated and in 1982 from the, where he was a Harry S Truman Scholar from the state of Pennsylvania, majoring in political science, and earned his Ph.D. From the in 1988 in the same field. During his doctoral program he was a for a class taught by the high-profile international relations scholar. He taught international relations at from 1994 to 1999 and air power strategy at the 's from 1991 to 1994. Since 1999, he has taught at the, where he is now tenured.

In the past he has done significant work on coercive air power. He defines the focus of his current work as 'the causes of suicide terrorism and the politics of unipolarity.' In addition to his research and teaching duties, Pape has been the director of the graduate studies department of political science as well as the chair of the at the University of Chicago. Since 1999 he has co-directed the Program on International Security Policy with Mearsheimer, and since 2004 he has directed CPOST.CPOST After presenting preliminary data on his research into suicide terrorism in the in 2003, Pape founded the, which he directs.

The project is funded by the, the 's, the University of Chicago, and the.On December 22, 2009, Pape's Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) launched its. The website contains a portion of Pape's suicide terrorism database as well as work by Pape and other members of the CPOST community.Also in December 2009, published an issue on terrorism featuring content exclusively from the CPOST community. In addition editing the volume, Pape contributed the essay, outlining the current state of terrorism research, the issue included contributions from Nichole Argo, Risa Brooks, Jenna Jordan, and Lindsey A. O'Rourke.Politics During the, Pape served as an adviser to both. Publications Books Bombing to Win Pape published his first full-length book in 1996, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. In it, Pape questions the conventional wisdom that coercive air power is both effective and relatively cheap.

Rather than coercing citizens of the bombed nation to rise up against their government, coercive air power often backfires, resulting in a citizenry that is both surprisingly resilient and loyal to their government.Pape also argues that air power and land power should be integrated and used together in a ' fashion. In Pape's model, enemy land forces faced with both air and land power will be forced to either mass and therefore be vulnerable to attack from the air, or will be forced to scatter and therefore be vulnerable to being mopped up by land power. Pape cites certain battles in as examples of a hammer and anvil approach. Elsewhere, Pape has continued his criticisms of the idea that wars can be won through air power alone. In his book, Pape denies can have strategic effect under any circumstances. He argues that the use of air power for punishment, that is, attacking civilian and economic targets (such as in or the of in 1945), has almost universally failed in targets.

Instead, Pape suggests that successful usage of air power has come when it is used against conventional military targets and denies the target the ability to achieve their aims (such as in ).A 1999 funded by the 'explored the role of air power as a coercive instrument', attempting to rebut Pape's claim. They concluded that, 'Although the United States and the USAF have scored some notable successes, the record is mixed.' Horowitz and Reiter applied 'multivariate probit analysis to all instances of air power coercion from 1917 to 1999'. Their quantitative analyses essentially matched Pape's qualitative assessment that attacking military targets has improved the chances of success, but 'higher levels of civilian vulnerability have no effect on the chances of coercion success'.Pape has been criticized by who insist his arguments are selective. Pape denies that the German, the and even (after the event) had strategic effect. Other experts claim the operations had rapidly forced the Dutch, Yugoslavs, and Serbs into capitulation. Dying to Win Pape's (2005) contradicts many widely held beliefs about suicide.

Based on an analysis of every known case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003 (315 attacks as part of 18 campaigns), he concludes that there is 'little connection between suicide terrorism and, or any one of the world's religions. Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland' (p. 4).

'The taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism,' he argues; it is 'an extreme strategy for national liberation' (pp. 79–80). Pape's work examines groups such as the to the. Pape also notably provides further evidence to a growing body of literature that finds that the majority of suicide terrorists do not come from impoverished or uneducated backgrounds, but rather have middle class origins and a significant level of education.In a criticism of Pape's link between occupation and suicide terrorism, an article titled 'Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism' (published in The American Political Science Review), authors Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W.

Ramsay from Princeton charged Pape with 'sampling on the dependent variable' by limiting research only to cases in which suicide terror was used. In response, Pape argues that his research design is sufficient because it collected the universe of known cases of suicide terrorism. In a rejoinder, Ashworth et al. Discuss how even large samples of the dependent variable cannot be used to explain variation in outcomes, why suicide terrorism in some places but not others, if the sample does not vary. Has also criticized Pape's conclusions.

Cutting the Fuse Pape's Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It is co-authored with James K. Feldman, a defense policy analyst who formerly taught at the Air Force Institute of Technology.

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Retrieved 2017-02-08. ^. Washington Post, July 10, 2005; D01. (2008-05-05),.

^ Pape, Robert, Bombing to Win, p. 314. Byman, Waxman, and Larson (1999). Byman, Waxman, and Larson (1999, p. Iii, 5/195). Horowitz, Michael; (2001), 'When does aerial bombing work?

Quantitative empirical tests, 1917-1999', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45 (2): 147–173,:., Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 269-273., Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 275-277. Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism: A Rejoinder, Draft Manuscript,. Moghadam, Assaf (2006). 'Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique ofDying to Win'.

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 29 (8): 707–729. ^, Volume 22, Issue 2, Fall 1997, pp 90-136., Volume 23, Issue 1, Summer 1998, pp 66-77.

^, Volume 23, Issue 1, Summer 1998, pp 50-65., Volume 53, Issue 4, Autumn 1999, pp 631-668.References.;; Larson, Eric (1999), (PDF), Project AIR FORCE, RAND Corporation, retrieved July 29, 2013External links. at the. on.